Pier+34+-+Heat+Nightclub

Pier 34 //Jordan Rutherford, B.A.E./M.A.E., The Pennsylvania State University 2012 //
 * Philadelphia, Pennsylvania - May 18, 2000 **

KEYWORDS: //timber piles, pier,// //pile failure, owner negligence, lack of repair, old structure, erosion, wood construction,heat night club // toc

[[image:moshulu.jpg width="400" height="300" align="right" caption="Figure 1: Collapsed Pier 34 and restaurant ship Moshulu. Photo Credit: John Fischer at About.com"]]
On the evening of May 18, 2000, a recently opened nightclub called "Heat" at the end of the 250' long Pier 34 collapsed into the Delaware River. Forty one people were plunged into the water and three women were killed.

The pier was constructed in 1909 by adding a large portion to an existing pier. Over 2,500 Yellow Pine piles ranging for 50'-70' long and 18" in diameter formed the foundation. A wooden platform supported eight feet of fill topped with pavement and was surrounded by a concrete seawall. The pilings were grouped into sections, called bents, which are one foot wide and span the length of the pier. It is rare to see an entire bent structure fail due to the sectional construction. The pier was built to support a train track across its length and also withstand bumps from ships in the river.

The pier's collapse is attributed to several factors. The piles were found to be leaning years before the incident and it was already past its estimated lifespan. A constant wetting and drying of the wood can cause cracks and general deterioration, while below the waterline borer worms can slowly eat away at the piles. There were also statements that initial reports found problems with the seawall retaining structure. (Zucchino, 2000, 1)

News coverage of the collapse by Fox 29.

Pier 34 stood in the Delaware River for almost 100 years before its collapse. Here is a summary of important events, data, investigations, and any other pieces of information that are relevant to the failure.

**//1909//**
Pier 34 was constructed, expanding an existing pier in the Delaware River. More than 2,500 yellow pine piles at 18" in diameter were driven 50-70 feet. They were spaced approximately 4.5 feet apart. A wooden platform sat on top of the piles and supported 8 feet of fill dirt with pavement on top. The fill is contained by a concrete seawall. (Soteropoulos, McCoy, Gibbons, 2000, 1)

**//1978//**
The Philadelphia Department of Commerce performed a study on Port Facilities. It was determined that Pier 34 could hold 500 pounds per square foot. They estimated that the lifespan (or the useful years left) of the pier was about 12 years (1990). (Zucchino, 2000, 1)

//** 1984 **//
Lawyer turned developer Michael Asbell purchased Pier 34 for $850,000. (Zausner, 2000,1)(Mongeluzzi)

//** 1992 **//
Eli Karetny opens nightclub called Eli's Pier 34. (Zausner, 2000,1)

**//1994-1995//**
S.T. Hudson Engineers from New Jersey performed a dive survey. They found that some of the piles away from the shoreline were leaning toward the east. Reports say that part of the west end of Pier 34 collapsed due to the pilings being damaged by exposure to heavy ice build up the previous winter. A structural survey in January of 1995 deemed the pier in fair condition with some deficient piles. Ten months later, after more cracking was noticed, another survey was performed. The piles were found to be leaning in the outshore direction. A group of engineers including the president of S.T. Hudson sat down with Karetny and Asbell. They suggested the entire pier be reconstructed but the idea was dismissed due to the high cost. A decision to stabilize the Pier was decided upon by Karetny/Asbell, but did not continue reaccess and monitor it throughout the process per the engineers instructions. Karetny begins negotiations with Dorrance Hamilton to bring a 400 foot ship called the Moshulu to the pier to serve as a floating restaurant. Hamilton lent $500,000 for repairs while opening the Moshulu in 1996 and purchasing Eli's nightclub, renaming it Heat. (Commonwealth VS Karetny, 2005, 2)(Egan, 2004)

**//1995-2000//**
Dive Surveys and Repairs were performed by S.T. Hudson and J.E. Brenneman. A five year contract was signed in January of 1996 for pier stabilization by both firms. (Shaw, 2006, 2)

**//1999//**
Robert Hudson, President of J.E. Brenneman, showed a 1.5" crack to the club operator, Eli Karetny. He told him that it was serious, but was referred to the pier owner, Michael Asbell, who declined the suggested monitoring surveys. (Commonwealth VS Karetny, 2005, 2)(Shaw, 2006)

**//2000//**
//May-//John Jones, a service manager for Suburban Propane went to repair a gas pipeline that was bent and leaking. Jones asked Karetny how a strong steel pipe could be bent and he said that the "pier is probably moving". (Commonwealth VS Karetny, 2005, 4)

//May 16-//A dive survey was performed by Jesse Tyson, a marine construction expert. He was the senior vice president for Commerce Construction Corp. but also used to work for J.E. Brenneman. Piles were found to be "old and damaged, needing repairs" (Commonwealth VS Karetny, 2005, 4) //May 17-//A one page invoice was sent to Karetny. It stated that there were "openings in the timber decks with deflections and settlement allowing fill to escape".(Moran, 2000, 1) //May 18-//Just hours before the collapse, Karetny called Commerce for another inspection. An employee warned him that a collapse was imminent. A four inch crack was covered with sheet metal by Heat Night Club employees. (Soteropoulos, 2001, 2)(Commonwealth VS Karetny, 2005, 8)

The city of Philadelphia hired private company Urban Engineers to investigate the collapse. Urban Engineers replaced S.T. Hudson in the investigation due to their work on the Pier in 1995. (Brennan, 2000) Initial reports stated that cracks in the surface and a damaged seawall caused the piles to move out of alignment. This can cause the slab to tilt and cause a cascading event.(Soteropoulos, McCoy, Gibbons, 2000, pg.1) Also, the old wood piles were not protected against threats such as borer worms. They had to suffer countless wetting and drying cycles which can weaken the wood with cracks. At this time no one issue is identified as the cause. (Zucchino, 2000, 2) A trial was held dealing with the collapse. There were two different versions dealing with who is responsible for the whole ordeal. Mark Faeth who worked for Han-Padron Associates of New York was hired by the law firms representing Asbell, Karetny, and Hamiliton. He stated that the three firms involved with the Pier, S.T. Hudson, J.E. Brenneman, and Commerce Construction, all should have recognized the signs of deterioration and possible collapse. Blame was put on Robert Hudson who was an engineer and Jesse Tyson who was a marine construction expert, both employees of Brenneman. Faeth stated that they should have notified the authorities about the pier's state, especially when Tyson warned Asbell and Karetny the day of the collapse. Faeth also formulated an alternative repair method that would cost $210,000 in 1996 and would have prevented movement and eventual failure. (Shaw, 2006)

Despite no specific cause being linked to the failure, the negligence of the owner Michael Asbell and pier operator Eli Karetny was a contributing factor to the failure of the structure that was their responsibility. Robert Hudson, president of J.E. Brenneman testified that both Asbell and Karetny did not take the most thorough and protective measures in making sure that the structure was stable and safe for the future. Hudson, along with Sam Hudson, president of S.T. Hudson, and other engineers suggested that the entire pier be rebuilt. The idea was shot down due to the high cost. The estimated cost to properly repair the pilings was about $1 million. Dorrance Hamiliton, owner of the Moshulu restaurant ship lent Karetny's company $500,000 for repairs instead of investigating it. They opted to install bracing instead which ultimately was not successful in keeping the structure sturdy. The engineers also suggested that the Pier be reaccessed and monitored continuously throughout the stabilization process, which ceased at the end of 1995 due to the cost. Hudson stated that they were fully aware that their solution would not prevent a collapse. (Soteropoulos, 2001, 2)(Burton, 2000)

In 2004 the civil suits involving those were injured and the families the 3 women that were killed was settled at $29.6 million. (Egan, 2004) In 2007, Karetny pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and recklessly endangering 43 people. He was sentenced to 9-18 months of house arrest followed by a 5 year probation term. Asbell pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy, endangerment, and risking a catastrophe. He received 11-22 months house arrest with 5 year probation as well. Both men were also ordered to serve 1,000 hours of community service along with launching a mentoring program for inner city youth interested in business. (Madan, 2007) As a result of all their trials, these men admitted to neglecting the proper methods of restoring safety to the pier. Individuals such as Tyson and Hudson also should have taken more responsibility and action if they thought the pier was in perilous state. Miscommunication, negligence, poor structural conditions, and the decision to make cheaper repairs can all be attributed to the failure of Pier 34.

Owners neglecting the necessity to perform full out repairs or retrofits is nothing new to the construction industry. Since the beginning of development and expansion in the building/operation business it has been an issue that is difficult to deal with. The money "saved" by erring on the side of quick, cheap, or inefficient repairs is not worth human lives in cases such as Pier 34. The owners could have spent more money and properly stabilized and repaired the damaged/settling piles and platform. The failure of a nearly century old pier shows that even more care and attention should be devoted to structures of that age. Although they are still standing after so long, it is important to maintain the structure and perform regular inspections.

Following Pier 34's incident, the mayor of Philadelphia John Street called for engineering reports from all piers to make sure they were all safe. City Officials also commented saying they want to begin instating regular inspections and will also investigate how other city's observe and monitor their piers. (Soteropoulos, McCoy, Gibbons, 2000, 2) It is unknown whether they continue to do so today or not.

Any new construction with timber that is submerged in water has protection requirements. These methods have been developed to prevent the failure of the timber that can lead to incidents such as the Pier 34 collapse. Refer to the Prevention section on this page for more information.

Similar Cases
//Hoboken, New Jersey-// In September of 2009 the corner of Sinatra Park, which served as a soccer field along the river, collapsed into the water. High tide and Low tide investigations along with dive surveys showed erosion and deterioration caused by shipworms. The city originally planned protect the pier by inserting 35 foot sheet walls around the field, but after more of the pier collapsed they had to settle on a complete overhaul of the pier. In 2009 the timber piles showed a 30-50% section loss but are now at 50-100% in 2012. The piles support a wooden platform and seawall that is very similar to Pier 34's. Rehabilitation of the 100 year old piles was not able to be performed, meaning all new supports must be constructed. A new seawall will be supported by steel piles filled with concrete. The cost to rebuild the whole structure and foundation was significantly more than the anticipated bill to repair the timber piles. However, the small corner collapse was a sign that potentially saved many lives due to the following evaluation and reconstruction of the pier. (City of Hoboken, 2009)(Moses, 2012)

//Newark, N.J.-// On October 2, 2012 a wooden pier and parts of a seawall collapsed at an inoperative biodiesel manufacturing site. The pier was over 80 years old. No investigation was undertaken. (Lee, 2012)

//New York City, N.Y.-// New York City Passenger Ship Terminal consists of three 1,000 foot long by 125 foot wide finger piers. Due to the Hudson River becoming cleaner in years leading up to 2012, marine borers have found their way back into the waters and began to erode the timber piles of this structure. A Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Pile Encapsulation system will be used to preserve the piles that are over 80 years old. More information regarding preservation can be found in the "History and Prevention" section of this page. Nearly 1 million passengers pass through the terminal every year and the preservation of the piles is essential to maintain their structural capabilities while keeping the it open. (Williams)

Timber has been used for more then 6,000 years to support structures. It is a renewable, abundant resource that is usually available locally. Timber piles cost less then both steel and concrete but has it's concerns. The main issue when dealing with wood is preventing deterioration and decomposition. Marine borers (bacteria/invertebrates) can cause damage to the structural integrity of the piles by reducing the cross sectional area. Timber piles rot when exposed to water and oxygen, therefore piles are driven deep into the ground so that they are constantly submerged in water where there is limited oxygen supply. This prevents the rotting process from occurring.In regions where the waters go through a high tide and low tide the constant wetting and drying process that occurs in of piles can cause cracking and damage. The water also acts as a brace when it is in high tide, therefore they must stand on their own without the help of the water. (Collin, 2002)(Zucchino, 2000, 2)

Ancient civilization would preserve timber by applying vegetable, animal, and mineral oils. The Roman's would coat the timber in cedar oils and pitch before charring it to increase the lifespan. Some piles used to support their roads were found to still be intact almost 2,000 years later. Modern protection methods began in England in 1832. Coal-tar creosote was pressure injected into the wood to preserve it. Today we use pressure treated timber along with other methods to preserve piles, especially in marine environments. Codes require certain types of protection depending on the use and location of the pile. (Collin, 2002) Examples and pile treatments are as follows:

//Chemical Treatment-// The use of chromated copper arsenate or CCA is the most common treatment. This method is generally effective against land-born decomposers, but fairs poorly against marine borers. The EPA has banned the use of chemically treated wood in fresh water and it is gradually being worked out of marine usage as well. (Acton, 2007)

//Pile Wrapping-//Pressure treated wood is usually assisted by the use of wrappings. These wrappings are applied to exposed sections with fiberglass or flexible plastic that is impermeable. This method is typically implemented when marine borer damage has already occured and the pile is trying to be saved. However, the seals can corrode and cause the wrap to become inefficient in providing protection.(Acton, 2007)

//Full Encapsulation-//The most effective methods in preventing the damage of timber piles. A continuous polymer sleeve surrounds and encapsulates the wood and seals it from exterior conditions while allowing it to continue its structural performance. The sleeve is filled with epoxy grout and grout that is pumped from the bottom up and forces the seawater out. Weak points such as seams, staples, and chemical leaching are all eliminated. (Acton, 2007)

//Fiber Reinforced Polymer (FRP) Composite Piles-// Developed in the early 1990's, these composite piles provide an alternative to steel/concrete and timber piles. A list of benefits included: low maintenance, impervious to marine borers, resistant to corrosion, lightweight, easy installation, able to absorb the impact of vessels through plastic deformation. (ACMA, 2004)

The Pier 34 failure exemplifies that old structures with deteriorating conditions must be addressed. The owners and operators of Pier 34 made the fatal mistakes of shrugging off warning signs and opting for cheaper repairs. Those involved in the surveys and inspections should have been more assertive in warning those at the Pier of their endangered structure. The choices of all these men ultimately cost the life of 3 women. Negligence, miscommunication,and unsafe conditions is a recipe for disaster. Unfortunately these situations continue to occur despite laws and codes requiring inspections and maintenance. The way to prevent such incidents from occurring is for regular inspections to be made, repairs to be done fully and correctly, and for any signs of structural weakness to be taken seriously.


 * 1-(AP, 2000). “Inspectors: Club warned of unstable pier / Report pointed out flaws before collapse” The Associated Press. May 21, 2000.**
 *  (October 3, 2012).**
 * The firms involved in the investigation are identified in this article.


 * 2-Acton, Stacy. (2007) “Seawalls, Docks and Piers Constructed of Exposed Wood Will Fail” 2007.**
 *  (October 16, 2012).**
 * Timber Preservation Methods


 * 3-American Composites Manufacturers Association. (2004) “Marine Piling and Timber for Bridge Applications”**
 *  (October 16, 2012).**
 * Details of FRP and its benefits


 * 4-Burton, Cynthia. (May 27, 2000). “Firm Says Owners Knew Pier Could Fall Engineers Say They Warned Of "Imminent Collapse" At Pier 34 Several Hours Before Three Women Were Killed.” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 *  (October 14, 2012).**
 * Information regarding the fact that owner's were aware of unsafe conditions.


 * 5-Brennan, Chris. (May 24, 2000). “Divers Probe Pier Debris Search Continues For Clues To Cause Of Club's Collapse” Philadelphia Daily News.**
 *  (October 3, 2012).**
 * Article on the replacement of the investigation firm and evidence collection.


 * 6-City of Hoboken “Hoboken Addresses Sinatra Park Collpase” Wednesday, September 23, 2009.**
 *  (October 15, 2012).**
 * A statement from the city regarding investigations of Sinatra Park Pier.


 * 7-(May 16, 2005 - August 15, 2005). “Commonweatlh VS Karetny”**
 *  (November 7, 2012).**
 * Court Appeal by Karetny and Asbell


 * 8-Collin, James G. Timber Pile Council (2002). Timber Pile Design and Construction Manual, The Collin Group, Ltd.**
 * A guide to designing and using timber piles.


 * 9-Egan, Nicole**** . (January 29, 2004). “Settled for $29.6 Millionn” Philadelphia Daily News.**
 *  (October 15, 2012).**
 * Article reviewing the settlement of the civil lawsuits revolving around the collapse of Pier 34.


 * 10-Gibbons, Thomas Jr.; McCoy, Craig;** ** Soteropoulos, **** Jacqueline.  (May 26, 2000). “News on Pier 34 is Expected Today” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * <http://www.klinespecter.com/news_pier34_pi052600-01.html> (October 15, 2012).**
 * Report of preliminary causes of failure and information on the city's actions.


 * 11-Lee, Eunice (October 2, 2012). “Bulkhead near former Newark biodisel site collapses into Passaic River” The Star Ledger.**
 * <http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2012/10/bulkhead_near_former_newark_bi.html> (October 15, 2012).**
 * Old wooden pier in New Jersey collapses.


 * 12-Madan, Rubina. (June 22, 2007). “House Arrest Sentences in Pier 34 Trial” Philadelphia Daily News.**
 * <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=5411692> (October 14, 2012).**
 * The final verdict of the pier owner (Michael Asbell) and operator of the Heat nightclub (Eli Kartney).


 * 13-Moore, Tina. (May 20, 2000). “Revelry turns into horror on Phila. pier” The Associated Press.**
 * < http://old.post-gazette.com/regionstate/20000520philly2.asp> (October 2, 2012).**
 * An article written two days after the incident with firsthand accounts of those who were there during the collapse.


 * 14-Mongeluzzi, Robert. “$29,500,000 – Pier 34 Lawsuits Settle for $29.5 Million” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * <http://www.smbb.com/verdicts-and-settlements/pier-34-collapse> (October 14, 2012).**
 * History of those involved in the attractions at the Pier and court proceedings/outcomes.


 * 15-Moran, Robert. (May 28, 2000). “Failure Warning Isn't Mentioned" Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * <http://articles.philly.com/2000-05-28/news/25615781_1_michael-asbell-eli-karetny-pier> (October 14, 2012).**
 * President of Commerce Construction Corp. Terry Zettle talks about the invoice sent very close to the collapse.


 * 16-Moses, Claire. (June 25, 2012). “Pier Collapse Prompts New Plans for Sinatra Park" Hoboken Patch.**
 * <http://hoboken.patch.com/articles/after-further-collapse-of-pier-new-plans-need-to-be-drafted> (October 14, 2012).**
 * This article discusses the new plans to repair the Sinatra Park Pier.


 * 17-Shaw, Julie. (October 21, 2006). “Expert: Engineers to blame in Pier 34” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * < http://articles.philly.com/2006-10-21/news/25416541_1_pier-owner-michael-asbell-eli-karetny-collapse> (October 2, 2012).**
 * A look into the firms involved in investigating the Pier and whether they did a sufficient job.


 * 18-Soteropoulos, Jacqueline. (November 15, 2001). “Engineers' testimony traces the deterioration of Pier 34” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * <http://articles.philly.com/2001-11-15/news/25320884_1_michael-asbell-eli-karetny-pier> (October 16, 2012).**
 * An account of Robert Hudson of Commerce Construction Corp. and the details of events in the 5 years before the collapse.


 * 19-Williams, Jim. Restoring the Port of New York. Structural Engineering and Design.**
 * <http://www.gostructural.com/print-magazinearticle-restoring_the_port_of_new_york-4206.html> (October 3, 2012)**
 * A magazine article that talks about the use of FRP to repair piles in the Hudson River.


 * 20-Zucchino, David. (May 21, 2000). “A Mystery Under Water Challenges Investigators Pier 34 Was Built To Withstand A Lot. What Went Wrong?” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * <http://articles.philly.com/2000-05-21/news/25615724_1_pier-collapse-nightclub> (October 3, 2012).**
 * An overview of the historical data surrounding the Pier along with accounts from engineers, investigators, and those involved in the collapse.


 * 21-Zausner, Robert; Goldstein, Josh. (May 19, 2000). “Pier 34, Moshulu Added Glitter The Renamed Nightclub And The Floating Restaurant Were Part Of The Waterfront Area's Resurgence.” Philadelphia Inquirer.**
 * <http://articles.philly.com/2000-05-19/news/25619541_1_eli-karetny-moshulu-michael-asbell> (October 3, 2012).**
 * Background information about the Moshulu, Heat nightclub, and the Pier.


 * Additional Resources & References **
 * 22-Feld, Jacob, and Carper, Kenneth J. (1997). Construction Failure. 2nd Ed., Wiley, New York, New York.**
 * This book has a background on timber piles.


 * 23-Crossman, Matt, and Simm, Jonathon. (2004). Manual on the use of timber in coastal and river engineering, 2nd Ed., Thomas Telford Publishing, London.**
 * A guide to using timber in coastal and river areas.<span style="display: block; height: 1px; left: -40px; overflow: hidden; position: absolute; top: 1686.5px; width: 1px;">**Crossman, Matt, and Simm, Jonathon. (2004). Manual on the use of timber in coastal and river engineering, 2nd Ed., Thomas Telford Publishing, London.**

<span style="display: block; height: 1px; left: -40px; overflow: hidden; position: absolute; top: 2646px; width: 1px;">In 2004 the civil suits involving those were injured and the families the 3 women that were killed was settled at $29.6 million. In 2007, Karetny pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and recklessly endangering 43 people. He was sentenced to 9-18 months of house arrest followed by a 5 year probation term. Asbell pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy, endangerment, and risking a catastrophe. He received 11-22 months house arrest with 5 year probation as well. Both men were also ordered to serve 1,000 hours of community service along with launching a mentoring program for inner city youth interested in business.