Stadium+Southland,+New+Zealand

Stadium Southland Roof Collapse //Yewande Abraham, PhD Candidate, Pennsylvania State University, 2014 //
 * Invercargill, New Zealand - September 18, 2010 **

toc ==== = = =Introduction=

The Stadium Southland roof collapsed around noon on September 18, 2010. Construction of the stadium commenced in 1999 and was completed in 2000. The stadium, shown on the left side in Figure 1, served as an indoor sports facility and contained multipurpose community courts, event courts, a climbing wall and other state-of-the-art facilities for the Southland region. Invercargill, NZ suffered a heavy snowstorm of a 1 in 250 year snow design level that was suspected as causing unusually high loads on the steel tube truss roof. There was no injury or loss of life resulting from the collapse. The roof collapse was thought to have been caused by the heavy snowfall that took place (Otago Daily Times Staff, 2010) . After thorough investigation, it was concluded that the roof collapsed due to a combination of factors in addition to the snow loading from the heavy snowfall (Smith and Hyland, 2012). Some of the other factors that contributed to the collapse are design changes, defects in construction, and poor workmanship.

Following the collapse, the roof was redesigned incorporating better safety features and increased load capacity; other affected areas within the facility were also rebuilt. The stadium has been improved to a world-class venue. It reopened May 9, 2014 and was renamed ILT Sta dium Southland. It continues to host various events and shows it also provides recreational and sporting facilities to the Southland region.

=** Key Words **=

Steel Trusses, Large Span Roof, Snow Loading, and Welds.

= ** Stadium Description ** = Stadium Southland is located at Invercargill, New Ze aland adjacent to the ILT Velodrome which is the oval shaped structure presented in Figure 1. Construction of Stadium Southland began in 1999, and was completed in seven months which was earlier than originally scheduled due to acceleration of the construction process. The velodrome was constructed a few years after the stadium and it opened May 2006. The two buildings are linked with a seismic joint that allows the velodrome and the stadium move independent of each other (Calder Stewart Construction, 2014). The original Stadium Southland was constructed for $10 million. Stadium Southland has a total area of 98038 ft 2 (9108 m 2 ) and the roof structure consists of long span hollow steel trusses. The trusses comprised square hollow sections and rectangular hollow sections with long spans of about 120 ft. (36.6 m); the roof comprised 0.02 in (0.55 mm) thick profiled metal sheet cladding, on safety netting and building paper (Smith and Hyland 2012, pp 22). The trusses supported the pr oprietary cold formed steel purlins with two lines of purlin braces in each bay. The purlins above the community courts spanned east to west and north to south above the event courts. Figure 2, created by Smith and Hyland (2012), shows a 3D model representation of the structural frame of the roof with the trusses above the community courts ( towards the south) and the events courts (towards the north). Some of the trusses were supported on concrete columns and others had part height concrete wall panels with steel framing.

= ** Events Leading up to the Collapse ** =

While the building was under construction, excessive deflections were detected in the steel roof trusses above the community courts. The trusses were noticeably sagging and the problem had to be corrected (Southland Times, 2012). Remedial work was carried out while the structure was still under construction in year 2000 to address the structural issues with the roof trusses and the connections including some measures which were taken to correct the deflections. The deflections were caused by design changes that were made during construction to reduce the steel quantities in some of the steel trusses of the community courts. Specifically, changes were made to the design capacity of the community court trusses, the connections to the south wall columns, the connections of the spine trusses to their supporting columns and cracking in the spine steel truss (Smith and Hyland 2012, pp 15). Even though these deflections were addressed, there were questions of whether remedial works were undertaken correctly and if the design elements met the loading requirements of the New Zealand building codes. Also in 2006, there was movement in the roof line of the stadium where the trusses spanned the community courts (Baker, 2010). The roof structure was reviewed by the secondary consulting engineer who said the trusses were adequate enough to support the loads (Heaney & McElroys, 2014). Nothing was done at that time to correct this concern since the roof was deemed safe. The roof held up till four years later when it collapsed under heavy snow. The severe snow storm that took place in Invercargill NZ caused damage to some other buildings in the Invercargill area. Most of the snowfall was thought to have taken place from 8pm Sept 17, 2010 to noon Sept 18, 2010. The National Institute of Water and Atmospheric research (NIWA) reported the average ground snow was 0.45 kPa (9.4 lb/ft 2 ) and roof snow load at the time of the collapse was estimated to be 0.30 kPa (6.27 lb/ft 2 ). The allowable roof snow load for the design was 0.47 kPa (9.82 lb/ft 2 ) (Hendrikx 2010, pp 10).

= ** Investigation into Causes of the Collapse ** =

Before the investigation was conducted for the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) to determine the causes of the collapse of Stadium Southland, the structural evaluation of the structure was carried out so the cause of the collapse can be determined through structural analysis using the applicable design standards in New Zealand for the time the structure was designed. The investigation uncovered several problems with the design and construction of the stadium (Smith and Hyland, 2012). The full investigation report can be found here. The results of the technical investigation showed that in addition to the heavy snow fall, a number of other factors contributed to the collapse of the stadium as listed below. Although it was an unusual snow event, the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric research (NIWA) reported that the average ground snow and roof snow load did not exceed the allowable design snow load (Hendrikx, 2010). From the analysis of the snow loading it can be inferred that the heavy snow could not have been solely responsible for the failure. Some aspects of the steel fabrication were not compliant with the drawings. There were defects in connection of elements, welding and installation of strengthening and end bearing plates. Some of the connections to the concrete wall were brittle with missing connection bolts. Some of the steel truss members had less thickness than was required to reduce cost. There were problems with the steel shear reinforcement in some of the columns supporting the main roof spine trusses and splices were located at highly loaded areas of the steel trusses above the community courts. There were some design modifications made that were too late to be implemented during construction. There were errors in calculating the loading used for the changes made related to remedial works and design changes were implemented late into the construction. Although the design changes for the remedial works was peer reviewed by a secondary consulting engineer there were still a lot of problems with the design, the same consulting engineer also cleared the roof as being safe when the sagging trusses above the community courts were noticed in 2006 (Heany et al. 2014). Some of the design and construction errors would have not been missed if site supervision was thorough (Bach 2012). There were also cases of non-compliance where on site steel fabrication and welding for remedial works were not compliant with design drawings (DBH, 2012a, pp 8), the spacing of reinforcing ties with columns was also less than required by standards. The police was invited to investigate the collapse following the release of the investigation report due to the level of non compliance of the construction (HERA, 2014). The consulting engineer for the project had to take responsibility for his negligence and was expelled from the institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) for breaching the code of ethics and for his failure to carry out his professional engineering obligations (Hasell et al. 2014, pp 15). The engineer's action was a risk to the public and it was rather fortunate that there was no injury or loss of life resulting from the collapse. Kliment (1981) highlighted the importance of architect and engineer involvement in the construction process, the errors that were made could have been identified and corrected early on if site supervision and inspections were thorough.
 * Heavy snowfall
 * Construction Defects
 * Design and Detailing issues
 * Problems with Remedial Works
 * Site Supervision

=** Sequence of Collapse **=

According to the investigation report prepared for DBH, Stadium Southland collapse started at the mid-span to chord site splice in Truss T1 which caused the roof to be was displaced after similar compression failure occurred in nearby trusses T2-T5 above the community courts. The connected spine trusses were also displaced along with the column supports causing the failure to propagate through the structure and damage most of the roof. The collapse sequence diagram outlining the collapsed members as provided in the DBH report is presented in Figure 3 below (Smith and Hyland, 2012, pp 49-50). The damage at the roof level of the community courts and walls are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6.



It was reported that when the collapse occurred some tennis players were just leaving the stadium and there was one person in the building. They reported that they heard a loud bang and one of the doors to the community courts burst open, there was also flying debris of a roof panel (Smith and Hyland 2012, pp 33). Luckily when the collapse occurred no one was injured. There was extensive damage to the roof above the community courts and the event courts, portions of the end walls on the eastern and western side of the stadium were damaged and the main roof spine truss and column supporting events courts and community courts failed. The purlins were also damaged as a result of the collapse. ILT Velodrome, which is adjacent to Stadium Southland was unaffected and the structure remained intact after the heavy snow event.

=** Reconstruction of the Stadium **=

Stadium Southland was rebuilt and renamed ILT Stadium Southland and opened in May 9, 2014. The building size was only slightly increased to 107639 ft 2 (10000 m 2 ) but has larger sitting capacity. The cost of rebuilding the stadium was $43 million NZD, which is significantly higher than the cost of the previous stadium which was $10 million NZD, the new stadium was built by the same contractors that constructed the former stadium (ABL, 2014). The insurance paid about $20 million NZD of the reconstruction cost. Reconstruction started in March 2011 and the building was initially scheduled to be completed in March 2012 but was late by about 2 years and was completed in February 2014. The Christchurch earthquake that occurred in February 2011 was one of the factors that delayed the project. Design changes were made to strengthen the structure and improve the redundancy of the building following the earthquake which also contributed to the increasing cost. The stadium was also upgraded, the construction was worth the wait and ILT stadium is classed as a world-class venue. The lessons learned from the failure were adhered to and a safer and structurally sound building was constructed.

=** Lessons Learned **=

The space frame roof of the Hartford Civic Center Coliseum collapsed in 1978, it bears some similarities to the Stadium Southland roof collapse. There were concerns about the excessive deflections that were observed in the steel space roof frame that was not corrected there were also some design and construction errors which contributed to the collapse of the building after five years (Johnson, 2009). The collapse of the Hartford Civic Center Coliseum brought about some changes in the design and construction of long span trusses by introducing peer review of structural design calculations (Ratay 2011, pp 2). Following the collapse of Stadium Southland roof, several recommendations were made to the Department of Building and Housing. Some other recommendations made following investigation of the Christchurch earthquake were mostly implemented to improve the safety and redundancy of structures in New Zealand (DBH 2012b, pp 11-14). Some of the specific changes can be found in the Practice advisory for welding and section checks in long span steel roof trusses. The document provides guidelines for the inspection of roof trusses and weld connections. Some of the changes made in industry following the investigation were incorporated during the reconstruction of the stadium.

=** General Recommendations **=

When building failures occur and the failure has been investigated, recommendations are made to prevent reoccurrence, suggest improvements and implement changes that are beneficial to the design, building owners and to the industry. A summary of the recommendations which can be found in the report prepared for the Department of Building and Housing in New Zealand are presented below (DBH 2012a, pp 11-14). Some of these recommendations are also in line with some of the conclusions drawn from AIA in relation to checking design calulations (peer review) and making design decisions on the field (Kliment 1981, 2).
 * Existing long span roof trusses should be reviewed for adequacy, confirmation of updated inspection reports to ensure welding requirements are met
 * Buildings in snow prone regions with large spans should develop snow load monitoring, mitigation and evacuation procedures
 * Further research should be conducted to better understand snow loading for New Zealand
 * Snow load reduction factor on roofs with slopes less than 10 degrees should be reviewed- Snow Load Allowance AS/NZS 1170.3
 * Inspection should be required during construction to ensure quality assurance of welds and connections
 * On site steel fabrication should be supervised and completed by qualified personnel
 * Minimum levels of professional competency should be defined
 * Existing roof structures at collapse critical locations should be inspected for adequate connection detailing
 * Buildings susceptible to snow loading should be designed to resist progressive collapse in case of snow overload

= = =** Recommendations for Long Span Trusses exposed to Snow Loading **=

Unexpected snow events could impose higher loads on the building than the building was originally designed for. Some recommendations to prepare for unusual snow loading conditions as outlined in the Snow load safety guide are listed below (FEMA, 2013).
 * Long span trusses should have adequate bracing since they have lower structural redundancy than short span roofs
 * Roof load capacity should be increased if required
 * Metal plates connecting truss member chords should be inspected
 * Vertical position of trusses should be checked that they are not leaning out of plane
 * Faults in building components should be repaired as soon as they are noticed so they do not cause greater damage
 * Appropriate snow removal strategies should be identified and implemented

=Conclusion=

Engineers need to exercise an acceptable degree of competence, diligence and care for the health and safety of the public (Ratay 2009 pp 7.6, 7.13). Special care should be taken in the design and construction of long span buildings as their collapse could cause injury to the public or loss of life and property also insurance claims and legal repercussions could be avoided by complying with design standards and codes. Site supervision should be conducted regularly to ensure the construction complies with the design requirements. Also warning signs of failure should be heeded to so a structural failure can be prevented. The lessons learned from this failure and recommendations can be applied to existing buildings and new construction as a safeguard against collapse of long span buildings.

=Bibliography=

**< ** @http://www.abl.co.nz/portfolio/invercargill/stadium-southland-redevelopment.175/**> ** (**accessed November 15, 2014). **
 * Amalgamated Builders Limited. (2014) “Invercargill Stadium Southland Redevelopment” ABL ****. **
 * This website contains the description of the new ILT Stadium Southland.


 * Bach, Katrina. (May 11, 2012). “Experts Identify Reasons for Southland Stadium Collapse." **//**Building and Housing Information **//**. **
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 * A media release from Building and Housing Information, New Zealand stating the key factors that resulted in Southland Stadium roof collapse.

**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** @http://www.buildingtoday.co.nz/NewsItem.aspx?id=228 **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> ** (**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed September 28, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Baker, Jenny. (November 11, 2010) “Roof Collapse-What can we learn?” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Building Today **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * This industry article discussed the roof failure, the insurance claim and plans for the rebuild of the structure. They also state the importance of learning from the experience and ensuring new designs meet and exceed the building standards.

**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** @http://www.calderstewart.co.nz/index.php?ilt-velodrome **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> ****<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed December 4, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Calder Stewart Construction. (2014) “ILT Velodrome: Built to International Standards” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Building Today **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * Describes the construction of ILT Velodrome.

<@http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/Publications/Building/Guidance-information/pdf/practice-advisory-14.pdf>
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Department of Building and Housing. (May 2012a). “Long Span Steel Roof trusses: Welding and Section Checks needed for some.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Practice Advisory 14 **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. (accessed September 28, 2014). **
 * The practice advisory provides advice and information for owners, territorial authorities and structural engineers. It was produced following the technical investigation report of Stadium Southland roof collapse.

<@http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/News/southland-stadium-technical-investigation-may2012.pdf> **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed September 28, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Department of Building and Housing. (May 2012b). “Technical Investigation into the Collapse of the Stadium Southland Roof.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Department Report to the Minister for Building and Construction. Department of Building and Housing **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * This is a detailed report that contains information about the causes of collapse, including loading requirements and design changes, construction defects, inadequate site supervision and design and detailing defects.

<@http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/7d8c55d1c4f815edf3d7e7d1c120383f/FEMA957_Snowload_508.pdf> **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed October 16, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">FEMA. (January, 2013) “Snow Load Safety Guide.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Risk Management Series **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * It provides information on measures that can be taken to reduce the potential of snow load induced structural failures and it provides guidance on identifying roofing systems that may be vulnerable to collapse and monitor buildings for signs of potential failure.

<@http://www.ipenz.org.nz/IPENZ/For_the_public/complaints/211140202%20Disciplinary%20Committee%20Final%20Determination.pdf> **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed September 28, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Hasell, Brian; Brown, Barry; Hare, John; Blackler, Paul; and Whitley, Bill. (February 27, 2014) “Disciplinary Committee Decision IPENZ Vs Major.” **
 * Details the decision of the disciplinary committee in relation to investigation of the collapse of Southland Stadium. The disciplinary hearing of the consulting engineer responsible for the design of the building with the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ). It highlights some of the errors made on the job and the decision to dismiss him from the institution.

<@https://nzinsurancelaw.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/southland-indoor-leisure-centre-v-invercargill-city-council-and-ors-201406091.pdf> **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed October 16, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Heaney & Partners; McElroys Litigation Lawyers. (June 25, 2014) “Judgment of Mander J.” Southland Indoor Leisure Centre Charitable Trust vs Invercargill City Council & ORS. **
 * Details the communication between the consulting engineer and the Council in relation to investigation of the collapse of Southland Stadium.

<@http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/News/NIWA-snow-storm-data-collection-mobilisation-sept2010.pdf> **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">(accessed September 25, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Hendrikx, Jordy. (October 2010). “Snow Storm Data Collection: Mobilisation in September 2010.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research Ltd **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * Snow storm data was collected to determine the amount of snow loading on the roof. It presents information on the quantity and duration of the snowfall reports and the observed ground snow loading then compares them to those in the building standards for designs completed when the stadium was built.

**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** @https://www.hera.org.nz/Story?Action=View&Story_id=1616 **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> ** (**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed October 16, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Heavy Engineering Research Association. (2014) “Southland Stadium Roof Collapse- DBH Report and Practice Advisory.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">HERA **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * It includes points from the Practice Advisory and some of the actions being taken in relation to steel construction.

**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** @http://www.stadiumsouth.co.nz/home**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> ** (**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed October 16, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">ILT Stadium. (2014) “ILT Stadium Southland.” **
 * Description and photo of the new ILT Stadium Southland.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Johnson, Ryan G. (2009). “Hartford Civic Center.” //Failures Wiki//. **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><http://failures.wikispaces.com/Hartford+Civic+Center+%28Johnson%29> (accessed September 30, 2014). **
 * This failures wiki installment discusses the collapse of the Hartford Civic Center Coliseum. The similarities of this collapse with the Stadium Southland collapse were mentioned.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Kliment, Stephen A. (1981). “Towards Safer Long-Span Buildings.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The American Institute of Architects **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * This book presents a review of the convention of professional panel of architects, engineers and contractors, set up by the American Institute of Architects to discuss the collapse of long-span buildings.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">New Zealand Engineering News. (July 11, 2012). “Snow not enough to bring down roof of Southland Stadium.” **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** @http://www.engineeringnews.co.nz/content/snow-not-enough-to-bring-down-roof-of-southland-stadium/ **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> **(**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed October 1, 2014). **
 * This news report stated that snow loading was insufficient to cause the collapse of Stadium Southland’s roof. They highlighted the level of non-compliance uncovered from the investigation findings.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Otago Daily Times Staff. (December 10, 2010). “Workmanship Blamed for Stadium Roof Collapse.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Otago Daily Times **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** @http://www.odt.co.nz/your-town/invercargill/140204/worksmanship-blamed-stadium-roof-collapse?page=0%2C0 **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> ** **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed September 25, 2014). **
 * This article explains some of the findings of the investigation and issues with past repairs that were carried out in 2000.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Ratay, Robert T. (April, 2011) “Changes in Codes, Standards and Practices Following Structural Failures: Part 2.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Structure Magazine **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< ** http://www.structuremag.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/C-CS-Ratay-April111.pdf**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> (****<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed October 16, 2014 **** ). **
 * This article is part of a series providing examples of the changes that have been made in structural design and construction from past structural failures. Part 2 focuses on the changes made from building failures.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Ratay, Robert T. (November 16, 2009). “Forensic Structural Engineering Handbook.” Second Edition. **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">McGraw-Hill Professional **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * This book covers a various topics related to building failures causes of failure, engineering response to failure, and failure-damage modes in steel structures. It also talks about the legal concern after a failure and how the legal aspects may be handled.

<@http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/News/stadium-southland-hyland-report.pdf> **<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">(accessed September 25, 2014). **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Smith, Ashley and Hyland, Clark. (May 11, 2012). “Stadium Southland Roof Collapse Report .” Structuresmith and Hyland Consultants Limited. Final Investigation Report. **
 * Report prepared by consulting engineers providing a detailed analysis following the investigation of the Stadium Southland roof collapse. It provides several images, illustrations and calculations related to the failure. It also discusses the collapse sequence, causes of the roof collapse and provides some recommendations for future designs.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Southland Times Staff Reporters. (December 12, 2012). “Police called over Building Disaster.” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The Southland Times **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< **@http://www.stuff.co.nz/southland-times/news/6908223/Police-called-over-building-disaster**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> (****<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed September 28, 2014 **** ). **
 * This article reports the decision to involve the police following the investigation of the Southland Stadium roof collapse.


 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">WeatherWatch. (September 21, 2010). “Exclusive Photos: Major Damage after Stadium Southland's Roof collapses under Snow” **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Weatherwatch New Zealand **//**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">. **
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">< **@http://www.weatherwatch.co.nz/content/exclusive-photos-major-damage-stadium-southlands-roof-collapses-under-snow**<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">> (****<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">accessed September 28, 2014 ****).**
 * Contains photos of damage to the walls of the stadium following the heavy snow.